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Introduction 
This article examines a specific juncture in the urban history of Buenos Aires, the mid-
1950s, to argue that it constituted a key moment when earlier ideas regarding housing and 
planning were revisited, preparing the way for the policies which would follow in later 
decades, and simultaneously reflecting contemporaneous local and international 
concerns. More specifically, the article will analyze the way in which Argentine 
shantytowns were first conceived of by the state, the contradictions and tensions this 
conception presented within a housing policy context which was changing dramatically, 
and the close engagement of these discussions with the inter-American planning debate. 
To this aim the article takes a key state document of the period, the Plan de Emergencia 
(Emergency Plan; PE; 1956), as a case study, since it represented not only the first 
shantytown eradication plan in Argentina but also a document which intended to change 
the course of housing policy in the country.1 The PE was a vivid reflection of the national 
political context. First, it aligned with the economic line adopted by the national 
government, which included the deregulation of the market and a gradual retraction of 
the bargaining and social rights gained by workers over the previous decade. The 
recommendations of the PE applied such policies to housing development and the 
construction industry. Second, it followed recommendations for Latin-American 
governments promoted in inter-American meetings in a context where the Argentine 
ruling classes were moving closer to the United States and its Cold War designs. Not 
least, the PE condensed judgements about the shantytowns that were widely spread in the 
mid-twentieth century, such as those which held the residents responsible for their own 
housing situation. In this way it condensed a large number of debates and perspectives of 
 
1 Comisión Nacional de la Vivienda, Plan de Emergencia. 
its time and was also to be influential in later decades. 
In a synchronic perspective (this is, cutting through the state of the arts of a given 
problem in a given moment in time),2 the PE stands as an excellent source for analysing 
the complexity of interrelated discussions on housing, shantytowns, migrations, and the 
role of the state and the market in 1950s Argentina. On the one hand, the members of the 
commission which wrote the PE were appointed representatives of ministries, 
associations and public institutions, which meant that its composition distinctly reflected 
the heterogeneity of the governing political coalition. In this sense, the article underlines 
the tight relationship between the PE and the national political agenda. Simultaneously, 
however, the commission included key professional figures of the time and therefore its 
discussions also condense the main contemporaneous perspectives toward shantytowns, 
planning and housing. Furthermore, in a Cold War context where planning debates were 
rapidly gaining momentum,3 the PE writing commission sought to engage with them by 
picking up on the housing ideas debated at the most recent Inter American conference 
(Caracas, 1954) and by sending a delegate to the First Inter-American Technical Meeting 
on Housing and Planning (Bogotá, 1956), where the Inter-American Planning Society 
would be created. In this way the PE, as a state and technical document, sheds light on 
key social, political, urban and economic aspects of its historical context.  
In a diachronic perspective (attending to the evolution and changes in the ideas 
involved), meanwhile, this article argues that the PE picked up a long-standing debate, 
that on slum clearance, and applied it to the contemporaneous phenomenon of 
shantytowns. The years 1955-1958 have been traditionally considered a transitional 
 
2 Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics, 79–181. 
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moment in Argentine history and for such reason very often disregarded, or studied as 
part of longer time spans. This article, on the contrary, is interested in this specific period 
precisely for the transitional character that it implies. Produced within this context, the 
PE was the first in a series of national and municipal attempts at evicting shantytowns in 
Argentina.  Thus, while recasting aspects of the housing discussion that had been 
advanced earlier in the century, it set up a founding precedent for later initiatives.  
This article offers a unique contribution to housing and shantytown history in 
Buenos Aires. Despite its key role for housing policy history, the PE has received scarce 
focused scholarly attention, and when studied it has been usually addressed as part of 
broader developments.4 Regarding shantytowns, the growing interest on urban 
informality in Argentina (and globally) has not yet translated into systematic scholarship 
about their histories.5 Their earlier decades of expansion, in particular, remain notably 
unrevised, although some works which address this gap are starting to emerge.6 More 
generally, despite raising enthusiasm about the cultural history of 1960s Buenos Aires,7 
the urban plans implemented between 1955 and 1976 have been seldom analyzed, as have 
the state initiatives toward shantytowns.8 Finally, the works of Leandro Benmergui and 
Adrián Gorelik have pioneed academic discussion on inter-American professional 
networks and their relation to the Argentine intelligentsia regarding housing and planning 
 
4 Yujnovsky, Claves políticas; Liernur, “Las políticas de vivienda de la ‘Revolución 
Libertadora’…”; Massidda, “The Plan de Emergencia (1956)”, Scroope: The Cambridge 
Architecture Journal, 21 (2012), 42–51; González Duarte, Villas miseria.  
5 Cravino, Los mil barrios informales; Fischer, McCann and Auyero (eds.), Cities from Scratch; 
McFarlane and Waibel (eds)., Urban Informalities. 
6 Snitcofsky, “Villas de Buenos Aires”; Camelli, “Politicidad villera”; Massidda, “Utopian 
Visions for Buenos Aires Shantytowns”. 
7 Manzano, The Age of Youth in Argentina; Sánchez Trolliet, “‘Buenos Aires Beat’”. 
8 Benmergui, “The Alliance for Progress …” Massidda, “Design Exchanges…”. 
over the second half of the twentieth century, but they represent only the start of a much 
larger and crucial enterprise.9  The present article therefore contributes to the existing 
literature by deepening the existing analyses on the first shantytown eradication plan in 
Argentina, leading to a more thorough understanding of the origins of the current 
problems under analysis. 
 
Local Anxieties: Post-Peronism and the Expansion of Shantytowns  
In September 1955 in Argentina a coup d'état backed by a heterogeneous coalition of 
military and civil actors overthrew the elected government of Juan Domingo Perón. After 
almost a decade of social and economic changes which included the levelling up of real 
wages, expanded welfare, and government intervention in economic matters, Peronism 
had inspired both fervent support and strong opposition. The dictatorship which ensued, 
self-styled Revolución Libertadora (Liberating Revolution; RL), came to power with a 
vehement anti-Peronist discourse but with no concrete economic or political plan.10 In 
fact, even though its measures tended, very broadly, to liberalise the economy, the RL 
supporters’ diversity of interests and positions prevented it from setting out a clear 
government agenda beyond the rejection of Peronism: 
 
9 Gorelik, “Pan American Routes”. 
10 James, Resistance and Integration; De Riz and Torre, “Argentina since 1946”; Torrado, 
Estructura social de la Argentina; Sáenz Quesada, La Libertadora. 
The country's Navy, Air Force and Army again leave their barracks and quarters to 
intervene in the Nation's civic life. We do this driven by the imperatives of the love 
for Freedom, and for the honour of a subjugated people [...].11 
Perón had been democratically elected in 1945, and again later in 1952, with extensive 
support from the working classes. His administration had enhanced workers’ rights and 
provided them with social benefits; had promoted light national industry; and had 
restricted international investment and free trade, also strongly taxing agriculture. State 
intervention helped the government to control export prices, thus raising real wages, and 
to support national manufacturing. The centralization of decisions and administration in 
the state, furthermore, ensured expanded public employment. Thus, Perón’s supporters 
extended beyond the working classes, including, to some degree, the middle classes, most 
industralists, and the Nationalist wings of the Armed Forces. Perón rejected foreign 
political influence, and discouraged engagement with inter-American organizations.12 
Regarding access to accommodation the Peronist government introduced the 
concept of right to housing, which asserted people’s right to live in appropriate homes 
and state responsibility for its provision. This differed not only from liberal conceptions 
where individuals were deemed the main responsible ones for their wellbeing, but also 
from conceptions where housing the poor was seen as a charitative or humanitarian act. 
Indeed previous discussions had paved the way for this approach, increasingly 
underlining the need of further state intervention in social matters. Peronism however 
considered housing one of the pillars of its welfare policies and facilitatedaccess to it 
 
11 Eduardo Lonardi's speech when assuming the de facto presidency. Comisión de Afirmación de 
la Revolución Libertadora, A 30 años de la Revolución Libertadora, 175. All translations 
are by the author unless otherwise indicated. 
12 Potash, The Army and Politics…, 04–14. 
through direct action (social housing funded directly by the state and sold to the 
inhabitants in instalments) and indirect action (affordable mortgages). The concept of 
right to housing left an indelible mark in people’s memories and largely outlived 
Peronism.13 
The deepening of industrialisation and expansion of the services sector had 
increased migration to larger cities and with it the few accretions of shacks that existed 
before the 1940s had expanded, while new ones had emerged, leading to a growing 
presence of shantytowns in the urban landscape. In fact, overcrowding grew more rapidly 
than what Perón’s housing and mortgage programmes could cope with. Given the 
abundance of employment and housing opportunities, shantytown residents expected to 
be soon able to move out. However, after 1955, the fall in real wages combined with the 
gradual retreat of the state from social housing and accessible mortgages resulted in a 
scenario where the permanence of shantytowns became increasingly evident (Fig. 1).14 
Peronism had attracted the opposition of land owners and businessmen for its high 
taxation of agricultural exports, destined to subsidy the development of national industry, 
and of some employers due to the strengthening of workers’ bargaining rights. In 
addition, Peronism arouse criticism from the Left for not challenging the basis of the 
productive structure. Perón’s limited tolerance to active political opposition only widened 
this gap. Moreover, in the context of the post-war, many members of the middle class 
interpreted Peronism as an Argentine version of European fascism, which they rejected. 
Last but not least, some resented the symbolic social prominence gained by the working 
classes. Such an heterogeneous set of concerns meant that, after an initial moment of 
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support for the RL, it became evident that the differences amongst its supporters hindered 
the government's capacity to put together an overarching programme for the country. 
Indeed, the 1955 coup d’état was supported by a wide spectrum of military and civil actors 
that ranged from conservatives and liberals to socialists and members of the centrist 
Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union, UCR), including land owners, businessmen 
and middle-class professionals. These groups had gathered together to overthrow Perón’s 
government, but their internal contradictions soon became apparent. The leader of the 
coup d'état, Eduardo Lonardi, of Nationalist ideas, stood in power for a few months, but 
was quickly replaced by a raising military figure, Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, with a liberal 
economic approach. After two years marked by internal tensions, the RL called for 
elections in which Peronism was not allowed to compete. The military government 
handed over the presidency to the elected candidate, Arturo Frondizi, in 1958, 
nevertheless keeping a high degree of control over his administration.15  
Despite the striking differences amongst the RL supporters, some prevailing 
policies can be outlined. In the economic field the RL sought to gradually deregulate the 
economy and to open the country to foreign investment, also restricting workers' social 
benefits and bargaining rights. Related to this, in the political arena, trade unions were 
intervened and Peronism – largely the political sympathy of unionised workers – 
proscribed.16 Internationally, in the context of the Cold War, the RL sougth to align with 
the United States, abandoning Perón’s notions of self-determination. Not least, in the 
social field, the protagonism and freedom that the working classes had enjoyed during 
Peronism was severely undermined.  
 
15 James, Resistance and Integration; de Riz and Torre, “Argentina since 1946”, 73–101; 
Podalsky, Specular City, 3–7; Ballent, Las huellas de la política, 38–39. 
16 De Riz and Torre, “Argentina since 1946”, 96. 
In addition, the urban relevance gained by the shantytowns during Peronism 
greatly disturbed the groups that supported the RL. First, for extreme anti-Peronists, the 
villas miseria – the Argentine name for local shantytowns – were a result of Perón’s 
demagogery and the proof of his policies failure. As such, they were contingent and 
reversible once the policies had changed. Furthermore, in the context of modernization 
theory, shantytowns were generally regarded as a vestige of a rural past which had no 
place in modern society.17 Simultaneously, Catholic groups were particularly alarmed by 
the overcrowding conditions in which families lived. Finally, for the Left, the 
shantytowns were the disturbing counter-face of a society that failed to extend the benefits 
of economic growth to all its members. Thus, the RL plan of eradicating the shantytowns 
by re-accommodating its residents into purpose-built complexes of social housing had the 
potential of addressing all these concerns in a single move. 
 
The Comisión Nacional de la Vivienda and its approach  
Within the described context one of the few aspects on which the RL supporters coincided 
was on the need of clearing out problems left, in their views, by the previous 
administration. Convinced that these should be approached through technical bodies, the 
government appointed several temporary commissions to address specific issues, creating 
the Comisión Nacional de la Vivienda (National Housing Commission; CNV) to deal 
with housing.18 The CNV members were representatives of ministries, state banks, unions 
and industrial associations related to construction, reflecting the heterogeneous coalition 
 
17 Benmergui, “The Transnationalization of the ‘Housing Problem’”; Gorelik, “Pan American 
Routes”. 
18 Decree 6.404; Comisión Nacional de la Vivienda, Plan de Emergencia, 14. 
that supported the RL. Not only did the members of the CNV come from diverse political 
backgrounds, but in many cases they had slightly different positions about housing as 
well. The CNV president, for example, Luis Vicente Migone, was a civil engineer active 
in designing built-to-rent apartments for the higher and middle classes during the 1940s.19 
During those decades Migone had promoted prefabrication and improvements for the 
construction industry, and in 1944 he had taken part in the writing of the 1944 Buenos 
Aires building regulations after a study of United States planning codes.20 Following this 
interest he had taken part in the writing of the 1944 Buenos Aires building regulations, 
which are, with amendments, in force until today. Migone had also been president of the 
Centro Argentino de Ingenieros (Argentine Engineers Centre, CAI) and co-founder of the 
Cámara Argentina de la Construcción (Argentine Construction Chamber, CAC).  
In 1939 Migone attended the First Pan-American Congress of Low-Cost Housing 
(Buenos Aires) as representative of the CAI, and from 1943 to 1946 he was a member of 
a housing commission previous to the CNV, the Comisión Asesora de la Vivienda 
Popular (Advisory Commission of Popular Housing). Migone was interested in 
enganging with inter-American networks and in 1947 had contributed to create the Pan 
American Federation of Engineers.21 The appointment of an engineer to the role of 
president of the CNV is an eloquent statement about the government’s technocratic 
approach. More importantly, the designation of Migone in particular, with his strong 
 
19 Migone, “Casa de renta…”; Migone, “Casa de departamentos reducidos”. 
20 Migone, “La vivienda popular y la técnica”; Migone, Las ciudades de los EE.UU.; Lecuona, 
“Conceptos políticos y sociales…”, 37–39. 
21 Liernur, “Las políticas de vivienda…”, 71; Unión Panamericana de Asociaciones de Ingenieros, 
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connections to the CAI and the CAC, reflects the influence that the construction industry 
would have on governmental decisions. 
 Antonio Bonet, general secretary of the CNV, was one of the most notorious 
architects in Buenos Aires at the time. Other well-known members of the CNV were 
architects José Aslan, Jorge Kalnay, Bartolomé Repetto and Jaime Roca, as well as civil 
engineers Antonio Vilar and Benito Carrasco. Like Bonet, many of these had helped 
disseminating modern architecture. Nicolás Babini, executive secretary, was a young 
lawyer affiliated to the UCR who had written on low-cost housing. José Pastor, 
meanwhile, was an architect from a Catholic background who had published profusely 
about UK and US urban and regional planning concepts such as the garden city, the 
neighbourhood unit, or the work of the Tennessee Valley Authority, in the local 
architectural journal Nuestra Arquitectura. In 1950 he had been in charge of formulating 
a plan for the reconstruction of the city of San Juan, partially destroyed by an earthquake. 
Walter Hylton Scott was a Socialist engineer, founder and director of Nuestra 
Arquitectura. Thus, the CNV gathered together key professional figures its times, and its 
work can be read as a snapshot of the contemporaneous intelligentsia’s thought about 
shantytowns.22 
The CNV was charged with informing the government about the housing shortage 
and possible ways to overcome it. Its first report, the PE, was due within two months and 
expected to advance solutions for the most urgent housing problems. The CNV 
interpreted the shantytowns to be one of these, and it proposed to clear them relocating 
its inhabitants into purpose-built social housing neighbourhoods. Furthermore, it outlined 
 
22 Vilar, “La vivienda popular”; Babini, Realidad y destino de la vivienda; Pastor, “La vivienda 
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a series of recommendations to lower housing construction costs and to encourage the 
private investment. The CNV was in addition charged to produce a second report, Plan 
Integral (Integral Plan, PI), to outline longer-term housing and planning strategies for the 
future growth of the city.23 Like the RL, the CNV employed quite a loaded rhetoric, while 
the heterogeneity of its proposals belied the unresolved contending visions that coexisted 
within it: 
The country emerges prostrated from a tremendous experience [they refer to 
Peronism]; it must, still convalescent, take its first steps in the path of health - health 
of body and spirit. This emergency plan is one of those first steps towards the 
recovery of national plenitude.24 
A first reading of the PE creates a puzzling impression. First, its two main 
recommendations, state-sponsored shantytown eradication and the promotion of the 
private sector, can be seen as mutually contradictory. In fact, the relocation of shantytown 
residents into state-built accommodation, as outlined in the first half of the PE, would 
require significant funding to be thoroughly implemented. This stood uneasily with the 
idea that the state should stop funding housing construction and retain only its regulatory 
functions, leaving the private sector in charge of housing development, as he second half 
contended. The CNV introduced some discoursive qualifiers to minimise this clash, but 
the conflict of visions was itself rooted in the tensions of the political context, and 
remained unresolved within the document. Second, for what regards the shantytown 
eradication programme, the PE jumped straight from a description of the existing 
settlements to a detailed explanation of the proposal. Being the first programme of its 
 
23 Comisión Nacional de la Vivienda, Informe de la Comisión…; Massidda, “Urban Planning and 
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kind in Argentina, however, one would have expected a justification of the reasons to 
take this approach, an evaluation of other alternatives, or at least a gradual introduction 
of the readers to eradication as a concept. The acceptance of the idea of state intervention 
into shantytowns by way of eradication is, instead, assumed as shared knowledge with 
the readers. Examining the engagement of CNV members with previous and 
contemporaneous inter-American housing and planning discussions, however, offers 
important clues: in this sense it is possible to read such discussions as the missing 
explanation in the PE. Thus, the main ambiguities of the document can be explained by 
inserting it and reading it within its historical context, national in relation to the first and 
international in relation to the second. 
 
Global Designs: The Cold War and the Inter-American Debate on Planning 
and Housing 
The United States had sought to assume a position of leadership within the Americas 
since its independence, and this endeavour became even more pronounced during the 
Cold War. In fact, and especially after the Cuban Revolution, the US wanted to ensure 
Latin-American support for its anti-communist project.25 With such aims it went to the X 
Inter-American Conference at Caracas in 1954. At the same time, Latin-American nations 
were concerned about their own economic problems, and expected financial help for 
internal development and/or more favourable terms of trade with the United States.26  
 
25 Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy; Iber, Neither Peace nor Freedom; Benmergui, “Housing 
Development”. 
26 “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary…”; “Report…”; “The Acting Secretary of State…”.  
 The general tensions in the X Conference also affected the discussion about 
housing. As intimated, such discussion was not new. Already in 1939 the First Pan-
American Congress of Low-Cost Housing had been an opportunity not only for the 
American countries to discuss the housing issues that concerned them, but also for the 
US to promote itself as leader in the continent’s social concerns, displacing European 
influence from Latin America (Fig. 2).27 Several members of the future CNV attended 
this event, amongst whom Migone himself, Vilar, Carrasco and Julio Silva. The Congress 
main recommendation, unsurprising in its post-depression context, was for the national 
states to engage further with social housing provision. The Conclusions also advised to 
proceed to ‘the complete elimination of the so called “Îlots insalubres” within the urban 
radius’.28 The term ‘Îlots insalubres’, used in the Spanish version, was well spread in the 
contemporary urban discussion, originally refering to inner-city tenements in central 
Paris. It had been also used in the Athens Charter, a key Modern Architecture document.29  
 After the Second World War, the Inter-American Economic & Social Council 
(IA-EcoSoc) of the OAS launched a series of initiatives in the field of housing, amongst 
which the Inter-American Housing Center (best known for its Spansh acronym, CInVA 
or Centro Inter-Americano de la Vivienda or) became prominent. For the X Inter-
American Conference, for example, the IA-EcoSoc appointed an Ad Hoc Committee for 
the Study of the Problem of Low-Cost Housing to produce a report with analysis and 
recommendations. The housing discussion at the Conference was mainly centred around 
this report.30 This Report was a foundamental antecedent to the PE, and in fact quoted 
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directly by the CNV when presenting the key explanations about the emergence of the 
shantytowns. This one-paragraph long quote is the only quotation from an external source 
used in the PE.31 
 Just a few months after the launch of the PE, the IA-EcoSoc held the First Inter-
American Technical Meeting on Housing and Planning in Bogotá. A CNV representative 
attended the event.32 The event discussions and conclusions largely followed the Ad Hoc 
Committee report, and to a certain degree also the 1939 Congress recommendations. For 
example, they suggested that states provide services to housing already built in plots 
without infrastructure, which was an idea already introduced in the the Ad Hoc 
Committee report, which cited the self-help schemes implemented in the 1940s in Puerto 
Rico.33 However, the First Inter-American Technical Meeting conclusions presented it 
with further strength. Second, the conclusions went back to the idea of slum clearance but 
this time from a completely refreshed perspective. The Bogotá conclusions did not, in 
fact, address the issue of degraded housing as a problem of residents' vice, laziness or 
immorality, as the 1939 Congress or the PE had done. Differently, they stressed the 
mismatch between people's incomes and standard housing costs. It also included the idea 
of adaptation houses which, as will be explained below, had one of the key PE proposals; 
and emphasised the importance of keeping residents within their original area when it 
referred to slum clearance.34  
 
31 Comisión Nacional de la Vivienda, Plan de Emergencia, 43, quoting Inter-American Economic 
and Social Council, Problems of Housing…, 7. 
32 Comisión Nacional de la Vivienda, Informe de la Comisión…, vol. 1, 22 
33 Inter-American Economic and Social Council, Problems of Housing…, 56. 
34 Inter-American Economic and Social Council, First Inter-American…, 21–27. 
 The CNV stood as the main Argentine body in charge of building ties with inter-
American planning organisations in a context where the RL actively sought to reposition 
the country in the international scenario. Indeed, already in 1954 – still under the 
government of Juan Domingo Perón – and more openly from 1955 onwards, Argentina 
had sought to improve its relations with the United States, and to engage more thoroughly 
with the inter-American debate.35 The CNV not only engaged actively with the inter-
American housing discussion through the attendance to meeting by its individual 
members but also by inviting Ernesto Vautier, an Argentine architect who had become a 
key figure at the CInVA, to visit the country to advise on housing policy amongst similar 
initiatives.36 Beyond the Americas, the CNV set up delegates’ visits and training 
programmes with the Puerto Rico Planning Board, with the United Nations, and with the 
International Labour Organisation.37 
 
The Plan de Emergencia 
The PE, as intimated earlier, was structured around two coexisting arguments. These 
entailed different conceptions about the state, the private sector, and the roles of each in 
the provision of affordable housing; and can be related to the ideas of direct and indirect 
state action respectively. On the one hand, the CNV interpreted the eradication of 
shantytowns as one of the National goverment main tasks, and expected this to be 
achieved through direct action, i.e., by fully evicting residents and re-accommodating 
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them in purpose-built social housing. The PE deemed the residents responsible for their 
own living conditions, arguing that they lacked working and saving habits and were not 
concerned about better accommodation, accepting overcrowded conditions instead. They 
therefore needed to be educated, for example through the inhabitation of the new 
complexes that the PE proposed.  
On the other hand, the PE considered that housing shortage was the consequence 
of insufficient incentives for the private sector, an excessive centralisation of decisions in 
the state, and inadequate land management in the face of rural to urban migrations. 
Following this, it outlined suggestions to foster the construction industry and encourage 
private initiatives for housing development through indirect action, i.e., through loans, 
specialized agencies and adjustments to regulation. Ocassionally this referred to 
affordable housing, but most of the time it referred to housing in general. In this way the 
Plan implicitly shifted the responsibility for sufficient housing provision to the private 
sector, assuming that if adequately encouraged it would be able to provide enough supply. 
While direct action would be typical of interventionist governments, such emphasis on 
indirect action can be seen as more typical of liberal administrations in the economic 
sense (Fig. 3).  
The coexistence of both perspectives within one single document responded to the 
persistence of an interventionist conception of the state together with the RL’s aim of 
retreating the state from intervention in the market. Perón’s administration had not been 
the first to consider the state the ultimate responsible for the population’s dwelling 
conditions, but it had been effective in placing this idea solidly in the collective 
imaginary. In this way, state intervention was conceived of as the way of curbing the 
housing shortage par excellence – a notion which outlived Peronism. The RL wanted to 
avoid social conflict when imposing economic liberalisation, and for this reason it 
introduced one without drastically withdrawing the other.38  
Furthermore, the overlap of approaches in the PE can be also explained by the 
urgent character assigned to the programme of eradication. In fact, the programme was 
presented as an unavoidable but one-off action that should be momentarily tolerated due 
to the urgency of the situation. Presented this way, the high state expenditure it demanded 
did not necessarily clash with the idea of liberalising the market in broader terms. Indeed, 
also the elaboration of the PE itself was assigned urgent character, and for this reason the 
different perspectives within the government’s coalition, reflected in the composition of 
the CNV, had not had time to come to terms with one another. Babini, for example, had 
expressed some years earlier his disagreement with the idea that private enterprise could 
provide sufficient affordable housing – a perspective which proved to be key in the PE.39  
The influence of the inter-American debate can be noted in both arguments. First, 
for what regards shantytowns eviction and as intimated before, the PE moved from a 
description of the shantytowns straight to the eradication proposal without justifying the 
appropriateness of the latter and thus assuming that there was a common background 
shared with the readers. This gap gains meaning when read in its international and 
historical context. The 1939 First Pan-American Congress of Low-Cost Housing had 
served to cristallyse ideas that had been under discussion for some time before – slum 
clearance amongst them. Indeed, a few months after the publication of the PE, the 
conclusions of the Bogotá meeting were to recast some of these notions, combining state 
action with the idea of eradication: ‘[t]o recommend to the governments of the American 
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States that, in their activity programs specifically dealing with housing, they take into 
consideration [...] [s]lum clearance (urban and rural), adopting in addition the necessary 
prevent slum appearance and growth’.40 Second, for what regards the incentives to the 
construction industry and the promotion of private initiatives for housing development, it 
is possible to interpret the PE as a very close reading of the Ad Hoc Committee report. 
The coincidences in the approach, in fact, are evident: the analysis of the housing 
situation, the claim that encouraging the private sector would lead to a substantive 
solution for the housing deficit, and even the vocabulary chosen present striking 
similarities.  
Furthermore, both lines of thought in the PE vividly reflect the contemporary 
perspective of modernisation theory – a dominant mindset during the 1950s and 1960s. 
While a thorough analysis of such framework falls outside the scope of the present article, 
it is worth noting that, in line with modernization ideas, the CNV read the shantytowns 
as a pre-modern form of inhabitation related to a rural lifestyle which would disappear 
through the development of industrial forces and the expansion of urban culture. This is 
evident in the idea of re-educating the shantytown inhabitants to ‘adapt’ them to an urban 
lifestyle, in the hope placed on standardisation and prefabrication as solutions for the 
housing deficit, or in the references to the residents’ ‘low cultural level’.41 The 
modernisation perspective is also implicit in the discussions held by the IA-EcoSoc Ad 
Hoc Committee and in its expectations and initiatives.42 
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Direct Action: Eradication and ‘Adaptation’ 
The PE started by a description of Argentine shantytowns which stressed the 
precariousness of the constructions, the insufficiency of the services and the illegal status 
of the occupation of the plots (Fig.s 4-7). It included a census reporting a total of 112,350 
people living in the villas, of which 99 per cent were in employment and 49 per cent lived 
at less than two kilometers from their workplaces. According to the PE, the emergence of 
the shantytowns had followed the migrations generated by industrialisation and had been 
aggravated by demagogery. Thus, the ‘low cultural level’ of the internal migrants led 
them to seek the advantages of urban life without striving to improve their habitat – an 
approach that was in line with usual anti-Peronist discourse. In this way the PE 
explanation combined ideas that were internationally accepted with its own conceptions, 
influenced by the local Argentine context: 
Coming from poor areas, without resources and without working habits, [shantytown 
residents] have been attracted to the big city in search of economic betterments and 
the indulgences of urban life. But the social environment of the Villas Miseria, in 
which they have gathered by force of circumstance and for the lack of both incentives 
of their own and social help, contributes to worsening their natural tendencies and 
transforming these slums into permanent foci of epidemics and moral degradation: 
in their majority, their inhabitants require an urgent action of social readaptation.43 
The vocabulary used to describe the shantytowns residents offers a crude glance of the 
way in which the PE conceived of the problem. After insisting on the ‘moral misery’ of 
the residents, 25 per cent of whom were expected to be ‘individuals who could damage 
the social group –  sick and disabled people, maladjusted and delinquent’, the document 
stated that residents ‘suffer in diverse degrees of the same social disease’, have ‘fallen 
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into an abyss’, and wasted their scarce income on games of luck and alcohol, living in 
promiscuous situations and lacking any interest in saving to invest in accommodation.44 
Thus, the neutral terms ‘families’ and ‘economically weakest sectors’ employed by the 
decree which created the CNV gradually transforms, throughout the PE, into ‘intruders’, 
‘aberrant groups of uprooted population’, ‘helots’ and finally ‘troglodytes’.45 This 
terminology is in line with the government’s rhetoric at the time, which used to refer to 
the Peronist masses as groups of animals with phrases like ‘aluvión zoológico’ 
(zoological barrage) or ‘las patas en la fuente’ (the paws in the fountain). It is surprising 
to see that the CNV assessment of shantytown residents, which repeatedly labels them as 
indolent and careless about their living environments, is at odds with its own census and 
its introductory report. 
The PE proposed to demolish the shantytowns and relocate their residents into 
purpose-built social housing conceptualized as neighbourhood units. With this the CNV 
implicitly picked up on Clarence Perry’s notion of neighbourhood unit, relatively self-
contained and calculated and designed around the walking distance to a primary school, 
but added some specific further aspects. Perry’s conception, celebrated by planners in the 
United States and the United Kingdom in the 1930s and 1940s, had in fact been mentioned 
by the IA-EcoSoc Ad Hoc Committee, and also discussed by Pastor in Nuestra 
Arquitectura. 46 The PE neighbourhoods would have a community centre each (for 
cultural, social and sports activities); a primary school, a nursery, a centre for basic 
supplies; a chapel and a police station. All these uses were to be at a walking distance 
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from any point of the complex, which the Plan estimated would be about twenty hectares 
in size. Thus, seventeen neighbourhoods were needed, hosting 1,000 families each and 
leading to a density of about 300 inhabitants per hectare. The PE proposed to sell the 
houses to their inhabitants in instalments no higher than twenty percent of the family’s 
income, payable over twenty years and exempt of interest. The funding source remained 
the state.47 Eventually only six neighbourhoods were built for this programme (Fig. 8). 
The final design and construction were executed by the Banco Hipotecario Nacional 
(National Mortgage Bank, BHN).48 
The design consisted of the repetition of three housing typologies, forming rows, 
until the neighbourhood reached the required scale (Fig. 9). Given the CNV conception 
of shantytown residents, it follows that the new complexes were conceived as a means to 
conform them into what it considered to be the only acceptable norms. The housing unit 
was envisioned as an ‘adaptation dwelling’ where fixed steel and concrete furniture would 
coerce the residents into a specific lifestyle: ‘[i]t will be a true educational tool. It will 
propose a clear and comprehensible order in all the domestic tasks and will allow a direct 
and constant experience in the use of certain basic elements.’49 The fixed furniture was 
meant to impose the nuclear family as household unit.50 In fact, despite the wide range of 
households that its own census had found, the PE only offered houses for mother, father 
and between three and eight children. Thus, the usual practice of hosting relatives or 
friends just arrived from the provinces would be hampered by this layout, while the 
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single-parent or smaller families would not really fit. In addition, the units were designed 
to avoid elements that the users could destroy, such as timber joinery, hinges or removable 
accessories, since the CNV considered these ‘comforts that [the residents] are not yet in 
a condition to assimilate.51 Furthermore, the PE recommended allocating unfinished 
houses for the inhabitants to tile, plaster and paint, both to reduce costs and as part of a 
process of re-education through trade-training. What is not clear, though, is why, were 
the residents so uncivilised as the PE portrayed them, would they see the necessity of 
tiling and plastering their homes. In addition, as the census showed, it was not lack of 
insertion in the job market what kept the residents in the shantytowns, nor the need of 
gaining basic construction skills: 99 per cent of them were under employment, at least 10 
per cent worke as builders, and most of them had self-built their shacks anyway.  
The layout resulting from the repetition of units did not follow the traditional street 
pattern of Buenos Aires, where square blocks of roughly 100 meters each side are 
subdivided in 8.66 meter wide plots and occupied mainly in their perimeter, but created 
a new urban fabric. No reasons are given for this decision, but some hypotheses can be 
advanced. First, the new disposition might have been the result of the design process 
itself, i.e., the repetition of a given typology within the bounds of a plot in order to 
maximize its occupation. However, this would only explain why the design did not echo 
the existing fabric, but not why it failed to integrate new and old, for example through the 
orientation and disposition of the streets. Secondly, the somewhat North-South 
disposition of the strips could have been designed to facilitate even amounts of sunlight 
into all the houses.52 If so, however, it is unclear why they were not traced North-South 
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exactly. As a matter of fact, the rupture in the urban fabric that the new neighbourhoods 
materialised can be also said to serve the civilising mission advanced by the PE. It must 
be remembered that the houses were considered ‘adaptation dwellings’, and that the 
neighbourhoods as a whole were thought of as machines for the re-education of their 
occupants. As such, they were conceived as self-contained complexes where the residents 
would go about their daily activities without needing to enter adjacent zones. Likewise, 
no institutions within the neighbourhoods were intended for residents of the surrounding 
area, leaving the new communities functionally isolated. To be sure, neither the CNV nor 
the BHN expressed the intention of purposely isolating the neighbourhoods. However, 
their concrete segregation stems from the design decisions made. The very idea of 
‘adaptation’, in fact, implies that the CNV considered that shantytown residents were not 
ready to inhabit the city as any other citizen. 
 Some central tenets of modern architecture can be distinguished at the background 
of the PE designs: the attention to orientation, the repetition of a basic unit, and the more 
general design gesture of discarding the existing and creating something anew (in this 
case the urban fabric). The morphological simplicity of the white, flat-roof houses suits 
the modernist aesthetic sensitivity as well. The recourse to a low-rise housing complex 
can be read as a resolution to a long-standing debate in 1920s Argentina regarding social 
housing design: whether collective pavilions or individual houses were the ideal form.53 
Through the design of rows of repetitive, modern-looking, individual housing, the BHN 
advanced a new step in the discussion, since it combined peculiarities of both. In this way 
the PE not only consolidated the role of modern architecture as the main design 
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instrument preferred by the state but it also actualized it to an emerging set of debates 
about shantytowns and eradication. 
 
Indirect Action: Moving the Private Sector to the Fore 
In its second half the PE moved to a different range of concerns: housing costs, in 
particular the cost of construction, which it aimed at reducing; and private funding sources 
to expand the housing stock. To advise on construction costs, Section III of the PE 
analyzed materials, transport and labour as different agents that add to the total 
expenditure, dividing them by trade and supporting its claims with annexed data. As in 
the Ad Hoc Committee report, the CNV reasoning was based on the assumption that the 
standardisation of both materials (prefabrication) and information (statistics) would lead 
to a reduction in construction costs, and also help achieving the efficient building pace 
that the housing deficit demanded.  
The economic benefits of the introduction of serial production or prefabrication 
were not concretely assessed by the CNV, nor was is its feasibility.  On the one hand, in 
the context of a materials industry that clearly showed problems of infrastructure, with 
scarce specialized labour and high transport and energy costs, the advantages of 
prefabrication were not obvious, and neither was it clear who was to benefit from the 
implementation of this system.54 The CNV may have assumed that prefabrication meant 
cheaper construction and therefore cheaper housing for the whole of the population. 
However, this was not stated and it is not even straightforward to assume: under the 
existing conditions, it could not be guaranteed that prefabrication would lower costs, nor 
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did the CNV explain how so. In addition, even if it did, to concretely benefit the 
population, especially the ‘economically weakest sectors’55 mentioned by the decree 
which appointed the CNV, the promotion of prefabrication would have needed to be 
accompanied by other state measures protecting the end users and their access to housing, 
but these are absent from the PE. Thus, the ambiguity of the proposal leads to considering 
other possibilities. Yunovsky analyses the way in which large construction companies in 
Argentina lobbied for the use of specific construction systems, state subsidies and loans 
during 1955-1981, concluding that they participated actively in the formulation of 
housing policy, increasing their economic profit.56 Regarding the loans available, 
Yunovsky shows that the largest construction companies had connections with the 
lending institutions which smaller companies lacked. Extending Yunovsky’s reasoning 
to construction materials companies, it can be seen that the use of prefabrication would 
have benefited only large companies, which were the ones able to work at a scale large 
enough to make  it financially profitable. The PE, furthermore, proposed to offer low-
interest loans to construction and materials companies with more than one hundred 
employees, explicitly benefitting companies of concentrated capital.57  
 Finally, Section III of the PE highlighted three problems in relation to labour: 
shortage of construction workers in general, severe shortage of specialized labour, and 
low productivity. Standardisation, according to the PE, would help to curb the first two 
problems, since it would maximise the use of labour (this, of course, if accompanied by 
relevant training) and also systematise routines by working in plants rather than on site. 
In fact, years later a municipal housing commission would arrive precisely at this 
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conclusion.58 Up to this point the proposals are concise and simple. But in the paragraphs 
following the real dimensions of the CNV proposal begin to blur. The PE proposes to 
introduce labour incentives in the construction industry and yet simultaneously to reduce 
the impact of wages on the total cost of construction, initiatives which seem to contradict 
each other. Since incentives are supposed to be added to a minimum-wage, the resulting 
expenditure would grow instead of decrease. This ambiguity is not surprising in the 
political context, since the RL held an ambivalent attitude about labour at the national 
level. It is thus possible to suspect that, in this political context, the minimum wages 
would be removed and the incentives scheme used as the justification of a system in 
which the workers would see their financial security undermined. 
The Section IV of the PE was mainly devoted to study incentives for housing 
investment. Housing shortage was, according to the CNV, not only the result of 
insufficient construction but also a consequence of the centralisation of mortgages during 
Peronism and the citizens’ lack of saving habits. Thus, the CNV recommended to 
encourage speculative housing development through tax cuts and regulation adjustments. 
Simultaneously it advised the national government to reduce state expenditure in direct 
action, thus displacing the responsibility for the population’s dwelling conditions from 
the state to the private sector. In addition, the PE recommended to withdraw Perón’s 
housing rental legislation, which froze rents in a context of inflation favouring tenants but 
discouraging investment in real estate. 
 The PE did not explain clearly how these strategies would help to curb the housing 
shortage affecting the working classes. It was not self-evident, for example, whether an 
expanded housing stock would automatically lead to cheaper housing since, once 
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saturated the market of the middle- and upper-classes, housing investment could turn not 
to be profitable anymore, in which case developers may stop building. Arguably, if 
construction costs were to be effectively lowered by means of standardisation of 
materials, developers would still obtain a profit selling the units at lower prices. Still, they 
may prefer not to translate such margin to final prices. Furthermore, even if they did, it 
was not obvious whether such prices would have been at reach for those with the lowest 
income, since the gap between salaries and market prices was considerable. Finally, no 
allocation criteria were outlined, which meant that even when low-cost housing was 
achieved, it could have been bought by anyone, including individuals seeking either an 
investment opportunity or a second home, and not necessarily those in urgent need. In 
summary, without specific regulations neither standardisation nor expanded housing 
investment or lower construction costs would necessarily translate in affordable housing 
options for the public, but this was not a concern addressed by the CNV. The second half 
of the PE and its tensions with the first and with the political moment meant that it would 




The direct action advised by the PE was only implemented partially, and the indirect 
action put into practice in some aspects, but in the longer term.59 For these reasons, it can 
not be simply assessed as ‘successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’, ‘realised’ or ‘unrealised’ but it 
should rather be read as one more link or one step (in fact, a key one) within the planning 
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and housing discussion in Argentina. Despite its numerous internal contradictions, the PE 
represented a key approach to the villas sustained by a sector of Argentine society – the 
one reflected by the coalition that supported the RL. This was recast, at least in some of 
its aspects, in 1960s and 1970s shantytown eradication initiatives. Thus, the PE can be 
read as an experimental first attempt of top-down eviction that would later become 
systematic.  
During the following decades two larger shantytown eradication initiatives took 
place, implemented by further dictatorships: the Plan de Erradicación de Villas de 
Emergencia (1968) and the violent clearance carried out in the late 1970s.60 As with the 
PE, these conceived of the villas as an undesirable part of the city and aimed to remove 
them completely, without consultation with the residents. The 1968 eradication plan, 
furthermore, proposed to re-accommodate evicted residents in adaptation housing as the 
PE had done. Furthermore, the idea of eradication persisted in legislation and in local 
initiatives. Amongst the latter it is worth mentioning the work of the Comisión Municipal 
de la Vivienda during the 1960s, which included eradication but came to be overtaken by 
the 1968 Plan de Erradicación de Villas de Emergencia. In terms of clearing the 
shantytowns, the PE did not have the results that their promoters expected. As a matter 
of fact, the shantytowns constituted the only feasible dwelling option for a sizeable 
proportion of the society and in general terms their population kept on growing until the 
present. Finally, this article invites further research in the field. As the first official 
intervention in shantytowns, the PE is surprisingly omitted from the existing urban 
historiography of Buenos Aires. In fact, it is possible to read it as the initial, bare 
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expression of a particular Argentine approach to urban informality that soon became too 
politically incorrect to be enunciated crudely, but that can still be perceived today in the 
background of many initiatives. Since many of the urban programmes which took place 
during the second half of the twentieth century (in Argentina as elsewhere) are as yet 
unstudied, and yet they affect present affairs, the article proposes to deepen the writing 
of their histories. 
 
Fig. 1. Shantytowns in Buenos Aires by the mid-1950s. 
The red tracing indicates the location and boundaries of the shantytowns. The yellow 
dotted lines indicate the neighbourhoods built as part of the Plan de Emergencia. 
Drawn by the author. Sources used: Comisión Nacional de la Vivienda, Plan de 
Emergencia, pp. 74-78; Banco Hipotecario Nacional, “Plan de Emergencia”; aerial 
photos provided by the Instituto Geográfico Nacional (1956) and the Mapa Interactivo 
of the City Government of Buenos Aires (1940 and 1965); working maps of the 
Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda; and the periodicals La Voz de las Villas, Nuestra 
Palabra, La Hora, La Prensa and La Nación amongst others.
Fig. 2. Bajo Belgrano shantytown, Buenos Aires, 1955. Source: Comisión 
Nacional de la Vivienda, Plan de Emergencia, p. 239.
Fig. 3. Dock Sud shantytown, Buenos Aires, 1955. Source: Comisión 
Nacional de la Vivienda, Plan de Emergencia, p. 245.
Fig. 4. Shantytown in Mataderos, Buenos Aires, 1955. Source: Comisión 
Nacional de la Vivienda, Plan de Emergencia, p. 242.
Fig. 5. Members of the Comisión Nacional de la Vivienda visiting a 
shantytown in the city of San Juan, capital of San Juan province, 1955. 
Source: Comisión Nacional de la Vivienda, Plan de Emergencia, p. 220.
Fig. 6. Aerial view of Barrio Derqui, one of the neighbourhoods built as part of the 
Plan de Emergencia, shortly before its opening. Buenos Aires, Tres de Febrero 
district, 1958. Source: Banco Hipotecario Nacional, “Plan de Emergencia”.
Fig. 7. Typologies used for the Plan de Emergencia. These units, organised into rows, 
formed the neighbourhoods built. Source: Banco Hipotecario Nacional, “Plan de 
Emergencia”.
